Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. This paper summarizes the relations between Iran and the US since the fall of the Shah, the reasons why current containment strategy is not effective, and highlights rising conditions that are conducive to engagement. An engagement strategy centered on selective economic engagement and public diplomacy is proposed, with elaboration of how the strategy can advance US interests. The strategy's potential for success is subsequently analyzed by examining its potential to overcome obstacles to execution and its effectiveness when put into action.
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led to limited engagement with Iran, but his negligible success to gain domestic reforms against the hard-line Council of Guardians reduced US motivation to improve bilateral relations.
President Bush's 2002 statement labeling Iran a member of the "Axis of Evil" further estranged efforts for rapprochement.
An assessment of sanction effects on Iran does not indicate success. The US has banned any bilateral trade, US foreign investment, or US foreign aid to Iran. US sanctions also penalize third party countries (with business in the US) for investing in Iran's energy sector or providing weapons technology. The sanctions were initiated with the intent of "not trying to change the Iranian regime per se but rather its behavior...," yet the outward behavior of the regime after 24 years has not notably changed. 2 One reason for the sanctions ineffectiveness is their limited impact on Iranian trade.
Eighty to ninety percent of Iran's export trade is oil, a resource easily sold in any market. Iran compensated for the loss of the US market by shifting sales to other international buyers. 3 Nonoil trade with the US has been impacted to a degree, yet many US and Iranian goods still reach the other's market via third party re-exportation, the most notable occurring in Dubai, UAE. 4 It is estimated "under the table" trade totals between the two nations approach $750 million annually.
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The US investment ban has affected Iran's economy to a degree, but many other nations also bypass investing in Iran (with the exception of the energy sector) due to austere Iranian foreign direct investment policies. 6 The threat of US repercussions on third country investment in Iran's energy sector has not prevented some European and Russian companies from bidding on Iranian oil and gas contracts, which indicates the failure of US sanctions. Lifting trade restrictions on items directly consumed by a typical household serves multiple US interests. First, there is a direct benefit to US manufacturers by gaining access to a new market for their products. Second, and probably more important, associated marketing efforts to sell those products to Iranians indirectly "markets" the US and its culture to Iran.
Household wares, furniture, kitchen appliances, clothing, school supplies, televisions, and internet service can literally provide a "foot" into Iranian doors. Iranian citizens would benefit from the introduction of US goods by increased competition in their marketplace, which could ultimately lead to lower prices. US internet service providers would also enhance the public diplomacy effort by providing additional "windows to the world" for Iranians and help increase the number of internet users beyond the estimated 420,000 in Iran today. Lifting sanctions (and third country penalties) on investment in the non-nuclear energy sector can improve bilateral relations while reducing tensions with foreign entities trying to pursue the same opportunities. Iran's domestic energy use is increasing by 7% a year, which is 6.5 times the global average. 15 Iran has pursued nuclear power as a means to meet its energy needs, which has led to assertions about a parallel nuclear weapon program. US investment in non-nuclear power programs, such as hydroelectric dams or geothermal power plants, both viable in Iran, could motivate Iran to reduce its need for nuclear power. US investment in Iran's petroleum industry and resulting increase in oil production would help improve Iran's economy while also benefiting the US companies involved. There is the risk that Iran could apply increased oil revenues towards programs counter to US interests. If such a situation arises, the US can simply re-impose sanctions on investments in the energy sector. The US can offer a carrot, but still holds a stick.
US foreign aid to Iran for housing, medical and education projects is a means that puts benefits directly into the hands of the people. USAID project management controls funding and Dooley 6 has the capability to put locals to work on projects that benefit their communities. USAID also has means to implement cultural exchange programs, which, if successful and done with scrutiny, can provide Iranians with first hand experience of American democracy.
Public diplomacy is critical for the success of the proposed strategy. The message at the outset must communicate that the US intent for renewal of bilateral activity is to improve the quality of life of the Iranian citizenry. This places Council of Guardians in a position that if they deny American economic overtures, they act against the interest of the Iranian people. The most critical part of the public diplomacy effort would begin after bilateral economic activities commenced, modifying the message to emphasize American culture and democracy. The typical Iranian opinion of the US is formed from two sources: Hollywood and the CIA history in Iran.
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The lifestyles, opportunities and freedoms the regular American enjoys are relatively unknown.
The intent of public diplomacy would be to create informed opinion on America rather than a "popular" one. This would serve US interests by planting the seeds of thought in Iranian minds that a government that shares power is infinitely preferable over one that is an absolute power.
There are multiple means to execute a public diplomacy campaign in Iran. Numerous press outlets along with an established broadcast journalism infrastructure provide ample media resources. Eighty percent of the population watches television, and many have access to satellite dishes which can receive broadcasts from the US. 17 The possibility exists that Iranian media resources would not be objective in delivering the intended US message, or would be co-opted by hard-liners to distort it. Resources external to Iran would need to be utilized from the outset to ensure the US public diplomacy message is clearly heard. Radio Farda, a Voice of America production directed at Iran, and satellite TV networks are resources that provide such utility.
The selective economic engagement strategy seeks to avoid directly benefiting the Iranian government or military. However, the strategy considers the possibility of assisting government reformists in gaining popular support and countering the influence of the Council of Guardians. If Khatemi supports engagement with the US and directs his ministries to facilitate it, the US public diplomacy effort would credit his efforts, thereby increasing his popular support. The same would be done for any other public reformist. There is growing apathy in Iranian society towards reformist politicians, mainly due to their inability to enact domestic reforms over the veto power of the Council of Guardians. This apathy was displayed during
2003 Tehran elections when only a 12% of the voters went to the polls, resulting in hard-liners winning most seats on the city council. 18 Increasing popular support for reformists could be the first steps towards effecting regime change.
Probability of Success
The probability of success depends on 1) gaining US support to execute the plan, 2) Iran agreeing to participate, and 3) the strategy's effectiveness to influence Iran's behavior.
Specifically, the US wants to resolve issues with Iran's nuclear program, lack of democratic freedoms, human rights violations and support of terrorist groups.
Initially, the strategy must overcome US domestic hurdles. Congressional and Executive
Branch authorities with sentiments against Iran have to be convinced engagement is the better course of action than containment/sanctions. The lack of progress after 24 years of nonengagement speaks for itself. Economic engagement provides access where none exists today.
A strong point for this strategy is its minimal cost. The public diplomacy and initial aid effort are the only outlays, which could be offset by revenues accrued through trade with Iran. It must be noted that this strategy requires some level of "rehabilitation" of Iran to the US public. However, it does get the clock started.
Recent events have increased the probability of the strategy's success to influence Iranian behavior in regards to human rights. Ms. Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian Muslim, was recently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in for her work on women and children's human rights in Iran. She was greeted by thousands upon her arrival back Tehran, with a large number giving a "hostile reception" to the reformist deputies present at the airport, expressing a sense of betrayal at their lack of progress to effect political reforms. 19 Human rights already has a movement inside Iran.
This strategy will help support it via the same dynamics which can influence democratic reform. 
Conclusion
Current strategy with Iran does not involve any true engagement, which has proven counterproductive to influence the state's behavior. The selective economic engagement strategy provides ways to initiate interaction that is selective in nature on purpose. The intent is to engage the people of Iran in order to influence change within the society and ultimately the government. The strategy effects initial engagement through economic interaction (most interstate relationships historically were built upon trade) accompanied by public diplomacy emphasizing the US purpose of engagement is to improve the quality of life of the Iranian people. Part of improving their quality of life is to present American culture and freedoms to let them better understand us, and motivate them to incorporate reforms into their own environment.
The strategy provides a means for addressing the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran, along with democratic reform and human rights. Iran's sponsorship of terrorist groups is only indirectly treated by this strategy. The strategy's ultimate goal is to achieve the US interest of peace and stability in the region. It provides a groundwork of dialogue and interaction between the two nations to serve as a basis for working towards formal diplomatic relations in the future.
